

For several reasons, the problem of God was likely to always remain a problem outside the Phenomenology of Husserl. 'Outside' means firmly ignored, firmly held out of the borders of the worry and of the thought, did not even deserve atheism, did not deserve at one moment or another to be prescribed, to be the object of ostracism or more to be sentenced to death, which assumes that God was at a certain moment present on the ground, in the homeland of the philosopher and that there was a nearly unfailing complicity between God and the philosophy, a kind of complicity revealing rather than rescuing the cry proclaiming the death of God forever. God is not dead as we still discuss about death and it indeed seems that, for several reasons, for the Phenomenology that God was really dead because he was not discussed anymore and that, in all cases, he was no more a problem. From its beginning the Phenomenology, being not even atheist, seemed to realize silently and without a cry the project of a whole burning atheism of the end of a past century and whose cries still continue to resonate. It seems to coldly draw the consequence of an act committed the day before and draw these consequences with so much sincerity that it did not have any responsibility itself. For the first time in the history of the  $\varphi$ , the theological issue seemed to become accessory, derived and irrelevant concerning the psychological issue.

This for various reasons

Phen presents itself as a real positivism--abandonment of the metaphysical starting point, of all prejudgement.

Because it represents a critique of naïve and dogmatic metaphysics (sheet 5 – small sheets in the way ] like Kant, it suggests the abandonment of the concept of the thing in itself, the abandonment that not only it is used but also impossible as regards a Kantism, as the latter maintains the reference to a divine originairus intuition which would create in these situations the objects of knowledge and the reference to the things in themselves. The Kantian phenomenon is not the thing itself which appears and becomes visible for us, but it is for us that the itself has to comply with our finiteness; our receptivity to appear.

Conversely, for Kant [ ] the notion of 'itself for itself' which is a contradictory concept. But for Husserl, it is the notion of a being itself which would not be and would be meaningless for us which is a contradictory notion. Husserl repeats over and over that the concept of the thing in itself is an absurd and contradictory concept . All the things which are meaningful apply to a conscience and not for itself , otherwise it could not either appear or be said.

'the principle of the principle', what Husserl calls in "Ideen I", the principle of the principle', means that the last justification behind the truth, is the native and physical presence of the thing even for the conscience , either it is a sensible or an intelligible thing. The intelligible thing, the mathematical object for instance, is what Husserl calls a superior object created at the beginning from a creation from a sensible world. It means that at no time Husserl wants

to accept the hypothesis that these non-sensible truths because they are independent from all de facto sensible conscience. The science comes from the sky or is contemplated in an intelligible sky ( as Plato wanted it) or created by the mind of God : as D thought it or if they in one form or another justified by an infinite mind of God. They have a history that the  $\phi$ ion will have to discover...

Therefore we can find the main reasons why the theology would be in a way particularly missing [sheet 6] in the phenomenological horizon and, more particularly during the major part of the Husserl reasoning the reference to God and the name of God are as seldom as possible. Consequently, God is then quoted as an appendix or a pretext to confirm the legitimacy of the Phenomenology.

What I want to try to show you, over the 2 or 3 hours of classes devoted to the topic, is how and why the topic of God and the name of God should gradually reappear and reimpose itself in front of the Husserl thought. It will be reimposed not from outside like the other thoughts we can meet, the things we want to escape and which [would] be finally be inevitable and reimpose itself from inside, without any break, without any contradiction with the initial exclusion of the theology, through the serene and continuous development of its own premises.

Our first step will therefore concern the meaning of the exclusion or of the reduction of God during the first stage of phenomenology, step which holds its most systematic and most elaborated expression in Ideen I...

If you have already read texts written by Husserl or guidelines concerning Husserl (and if you have not done it yet, think about Levinas, Berger...) You know that the method of the reduction does not imply any doubt, no refusal and no objection for what is reduced or put into brackets, either it concerns the individual fact of the existence put into brackets during the eidetic reduction or of the whole existing world put into brackets. Concerning the reduction, I simply don't want to focus on the existence or on the non-existence. I neutralize all assertions or all negations.

Therefore, the reduction of God, or the existence of God, is neither a doubt towards himself, nor the contrary of a doubt, that is to say a position. This thing done, have a look at how and with whose problematic diversions that reduction in 'Ideen I' takes place.

[sheet 7].

God not being able to make the laws false... God himself, if he exists, has to comply with these laws which are absolutely unconditional, universal, independent from such or such thing that []

...

So in the first example in §42, Husserl makes a clear distinction between the perception of a transcendent thing and the immanent perception. The main difference between both perceptions is, you know the transcendent thing, outside me, the spatial is that it cannot be fully given, but only gradually, by contours (Abschattungen). The transcendent thing can only be seen gradually, by unfinished aspects. On the contrary, an history can immediately be seen and not partly and it would be stupid to imagine a thought, that is to say a being that would not be spatial anymore and which could be shown according to different points of view, according to various aspects...

That radical difference between both kinds of data is paramount and does not take the facts into account. Consequently, it is from the origin of the spatial thing to be given by contours. That specificity of the spatial thing is neither an accidental or contingent characteristic or predicate. It's its main predicate. We can vary all the predicates infinitely or we can suppress the spatiality, hence the necessity to be given by contours.

...

To assert that a being, God for instance, is a perfect and infinite subject of knowledge as [...] it means that there is no difference between what is transcendent and what is immanent. From that point, we would do what appears to us as being a physical thing outside us. It consequently represents an immediate and physical indication, something which cannot be an appearance or an illusion. If we admit that possibility as essential (and it is what we have to do if we admit that the divine perception can escape the rule of the spatial space), there is no more certainty than the indication of principle, more for a starting point for a physical speech. If we cannot [...] obviously clearly and immediately have the perception of the present thing in person, you have to give up everything.

Husserl was at the beginning of §43 'it's therefore a [sheet 8] error in principle to believe that the perception (and all intuitions of different kind on the thing) would not reach the thing itself. The latter would not be given in itself and in its being in itself. All existence would include the possibility in principle to be caught with the adequate perception which would give the physical difference without going through these 'appearances'. God is the subject of the absolute perfect knowledge and also of the perception of the thing in itself which is refused to us, finite beings.

That notion is stupid, if the inadequacy shows the finiteness, there cannot be the finite perception of the thing [...] such. Absolute evidence. But does it concern Kant, no space for God. But Husserl is in favor of spatiality which is different from the sensible form of the thing in itself.

[...] That notion is absurd, it means that there would be no difference in essence between what is transcendent and what is immanent.

[sheet 9]

Session to 12.2.63.

Last time, I tried to give the guidelines of these thoughts concerning the God of Husserl. We saw these 3 paths at least where God was missing and seemed to be always missing in the phenomenological horizon. And I told that my purpose was to follow the path where God necessarily and without any contradiction appeared within the Husserl doctrine. Our first step should concern the meaning of the exclusion or the reduction of God in the first phase of the phenomenology dealing with the most systematic and the most elaborated form in 'Indeen I'.

In a first example, we saw how Husserl dealt the case of God as the example of a limited hypothesis aiming at revealing the absolute universal characteristic, which is absolutely different from the eidetic laws, the essential laws, these discoveries with the help of the eidetic reduction. The of the [] hypothesis of God was the following one... God himself, if he exists, is a dummy example, a fact which has to comply with the universal law we apply and that cannot be denied. The first example here was the distinction between the immanent and the transcendent perception and the need to perceive partly the spatial thing. The transcendent thing called the body has space as the main attribute, it can never be given by ?? and its perception is definitely unfinished and inadequate. God himself cannot do for himself or for us, anyway it is all the same. It is not even for God to make the body not spatial and that the space is given according to a point of view, that is to say through...

Kant would have undoubtedly granted that there is a space, the immediate and pre - mathematical perception, spatial things have to obey that law of unfinished things and the one of inadequacy. But what Kant would have contested is that the perception as regards the space and the transcendent thing according to Husserl himself [] the thing has all its conscience in general, it [sheet 10] has to comply with the law of Abschattung, of the esquisse [previous emprises might be esquisses] of the ...but only with the hypothesis of the connection to the space. But, the connection to the space is not included in the definition of the finished conscience, of the finished intuition not creating its own objects and, in order to get them, has to submit that reception to the various kinds of the receptivity, that is to say of its sensibility. And the space is only one kind of...

Doesn't belong to the object en-soi...

But, for God, according to Kant, there is no shadow because there is no space / if we try to make you believe or to simply say, as Husserl. God himself has to perceive the spatial things in their area of shadow. We can say that there is some shadow even for God if he exists. It is according to Kant and all classical  $\phi$ , not to say anything, it is to use freely the concept of God, it means that God himself has a finished perception of the things. What is absurd, it is what Kant would undoubtedly say, is to put everything in the category of God. If the name of God is meaningful, it must designate an indefinite thought or a conscience otherwise I designate a false God...

[sheet 11]

What would be the answer of Husserl if we refer to the text we know now? He would say, I think, the following thing: The Kantian therefore assumes that it is possible, that we can imagine as a possibility that for a case at least, for God, the bodies don't exist outside the thought. Because finally, for God, the spatial perception is not necessary; it means that for him there is no body. Because for Husserl, and it is the essential issue, the spatiality is an essential and irreducible component of the body himself. I cannot imagine a body without a space, as D had shown. The extent is an essential attribute...

So we can say that for God there is no body, that is to say that the corporeality of the body that I am now perceiving can be illusory, through the transcendence [] is transcendent for me or in a finite subjectivity as a rule as opposed to H for that kind of suggestion (which finally ends with the distinction between the thing in itself and a phenomenon). For H, that kind of suggestion is the scandal of the  $\varphi$ . 'skandalon' equals trap. If I accept that it is possible for me, in the field of philosophy, I doubt that what is given to me through an immediate perception, I doubt the existence of the present body, I doubt the spatiality and the extent of the body, then nothing has a meaning, no speech is grounded on anything. Of course what I think can sometimes be hallucinating, to perceive a body where there is none but I cannot doubt [] of the body as a rule as it rightly supposes that there is an hallucination and the concept of hallucination...and

[sheet 12] I can have hallucinations concerning all...

The criteria of absolute truth, what H calls the principle of the principles would not be valid in a situation and would therefore lose its [] of unquestionable principle...

Let's try to perceive, without taking part, the meaning of that strange dialectic between only Kant and Husserl and we will soon see the continuity of these problems with the ones of the ontological argument and the method and the metaphysics we have just studied. Because, once more, it is the problem of the responsibility and of the [] regarding the finitude of  $\varphi$  which appears to us.

Indeed, in that dialogue, what would Husserl reproach to Kant: he would first reproach him for infringing definitely the limits of the things that he considers to be finite, the thing which can have an intuitive existence, the thing for which he can feel the possibility, his experience of the possibility: indeed, for none of his possible experiences, Kant cannot understand what a conscience creating its objects means [sheet 13] and of a conscience which would not be the conscience of something and, furthermore and in that precise situation, a conscience which would not perceive bodies or would not perceive them in the space. Kant cannot, shouldn't imagine the possibility of an infinite conscience to have an immediate appropriate perception of all the aspects of a thing. Because such a divine conscience, unimaginable and impossible for H, such a divine immediately [] infinite would not only be freed from the spatial transcendence of the thing. It would also be freed from time. Indeed having an

immediate access to all the aspects of a thing means that the perception does not need to take place anymore, to turn around the thing. It does not take any more time. I don't have the need for some perceptive time anymore if I have an immediate outlook of the whole space, if there isn't anymore.

[sheet 14]

Misunderstanding between Husserl and Kant.

Husserl: if a conscience perceives some bodies, it must perceive them in the space because all the perceptions of the body suppose the spatiality and if a conscience perceives things in the space, then of course, it has to perceive it through esquisses... but, according to Kant, it is only if a conscience perceives things in the space that it is linked to that law of inappropriateness. So, that photographic law, concerning the inappropriateness is hypothetical: it suggests the fact of a conscience embodied and linked to the space. It suggests the fact of the finiteness while claiming being free in front of all artificiality. And it suggests, and starts from this fact without recognizing it and without accepting that distinction between a finite and an infinite conscience, within the notion of a conscience in general.

Inference from Kant. When H says: in case God would perceive some space, he would perceive it in that way so he does not only speak of God, hypothesis...

2° when Husserl asserts that he is neither able nor admitting the possibility of an infinite conscience, which would immediately have a full perception of the spatial thing. When he asserts that, he is inconsistent and is not aware of that [sheet 15] says, of what he does and of what he suggests. Because the notion of ??? of inappropriateness itself, of infiniteness cannot be meaningful, can have its inappropriateness meaning only if it refers to a relevant and infinite perception I am aware of. That reference can be more or less explicit but it is unavoidable. It is on an infinite background that I can perceive the indefinite aspect of the finite. It is from the horizon of the full adequacy of my perception of the thing that I can perceive the inadequacy. And Kant would reproach Husserl not to ground enough on that link between the finite, the indefinite and the infinite and that difference between a finite and an infinite conscience. Neglecting the difference, making the finite conscience the absolute expression, he precisely forgets the finiteness itself and its condition and its derivation.

In fact, in that situation, H deals with that infinite horizon from which the inappropriateness and the non finito arise, but rightly, and it is here that we find the problem of the intentionality, of the infinite, of the indefinite and of the finite, the ones we studied at the end of the lecture on M+M- but rightly that horizon refuses to make it a present infinite metaphysics, the one of a God. He has also done what he precisely calls 'idea' according to the Kantian approach, that is to say an infinite opening which settles the experience and makes its inappropriateness appear. The idea, according to Kant for H is an opening with an

indefinite horizon and not a present infiniteness. It is the time itself and not a steady eternity. It is therefore on that problem of the links between the indefinite time and the eternity that we are stressing on.

[sheet 21]

Lecture 3 19.2.63.

Up to now, we have seen, through several examples, how Husserl translates God during the first step of the phenomenology, shown in Ideen I, like an appendix, a limited concept, a ghost chosen to make the absolutely unqualified universality of some photographic laws appear. If, God himself, in the farthest limit, if he exists, has to comply with these original laws, it is because that these laws are resolutely universal, unqualified, intangible. We have studied these laws. Second the law of the perception... and we saw to finish, how H either discussed about that perception which treated God with a methodological approach or when he showed that his words were inefficient, no [] theology, or showing that it was a misunderstanding rather than making him blaspheming or going back for fear of blasphemy.

In a second lecture, we will follow Husserl when he no longer makes the concept of God function in a limited hypothesis, but submits the hypothesis of his existence as the transcendental resolution, i.e. when he will describe the possibility and the need of a retreat towards the area of the pure conscience, which is an absolute and sufficient requisite for a retreat towards a subjective absolute which makes it possible and is necessary the enclosure into parentheses, the disposal, the reduction, the exclusion not only of the whole world excluding but of the absolute organizer of that world, absolute which can only be a de facto, dummy absolute, falling within the phenomenological reductions (photographical and ??). I have just made quite a puzzling summary of that process. Let's go into details.

To understand the meaning of that process, you have to know what H means with the eidetic reduction and with the transcendental reduction. As I suppose that some of you are not familiar with these notions or processes, I remind you briefly what it is.

First, the eidetic reduction: it consists in an act aimed at making an edios or essence. If Husserl calls the essence eidos, it is to avoid the metaphysical load of the word essence and free the word in a specific tradition; [ sheet 22] it does not prevent it from resurrecting the eidos from Plato but he doesn't fail to think that the eidos, if it is independent from the de facto individual existence is not [] yet. HE has no distinct existence as for a traditional Platonism. It is just the meaning of the thing and the [] of its mode of appearance.

The photographic reduction has the right function to isolate the eidos and to make it appear independently...

The transcendental reduction also remains a photographic reduction but, instead of concerning a de facto existence, as for the bodies or the structural nature, it will reduce into

parentheses the whole of what is transcendent with the conscience, the whole of what is the object to the conscience, that is to say the whole world in its de facto existence, to make the essential condition of the appearance in the world as a rule, to seize the conscience as a rule, which we will precisely describe with its essential structures. There is no world in general, that world...

[sheet 23]

Therefore the god of the religions is the first to fall within that reduction.

The religion is a phenomenon of civilization and of the history. So, what H reduces is not only the empirical science of psychic facts [], historical and more specifically religious, but also all photographic science which could eventually appear concerning the objects of the  $\varphi$  of the sociology, of the history. These photographic sciences H deplores that they are not created yet and he thinks that it should build up in connection with the phenomenology. But even if they would build up, if they have to, they would be dependent and transcendent in connection with the transcendent phenomenology as a science of the pure immanent conscience and of the cogito-cogitatum. So, in particular, here to reduce the religion into parentheses as a photographic science of the spirit.

[sheet 24]

So reduction means relativity to conscience-

But, is the whole transcendence has that meaning of relativity towards the conscience? Is there no transcendence which is given not relatively to the flow of the conscience, to the life of the conscience, but as the absolute of that life of the conscience. Is there any original transcendence which, of course, is not transcendent for the mode of the conscience outside the conscience and which, therefore, would be a transcendence not outside the conscience, would be a transcendence which would not belong to outside, to the natural world of the outside but would be transcendent inside the immanence, would be a transcendence within the immanence, transcendence in the immanence, that is to say a transcendence which would not be a relation and which therefore would be difficult to consider like a transcendent reduction.

In these hypotheses, it was about an absolute transcendence, that is to say distinct from the life of the conscience, but of an absolute transcendence where appears an  $\varphi$ , a transcendental reduction made, in the sphere of the immanence of the cogito.

The hypothesis of an absolute transcendent in the immanence settles on two poles according to the Husserl's description. It can have two forms.

The first one would be evoked out of pretension because it is irrelevant here. It concerns the 'I' or I think who, according to a Kantian language taken over by Husserl here must be with all my representations. As what I think is not for Husserl but was for Kant, a free shape, as it



is a reality, Husserl would not say if you want, with the style of the privileged deduction and of the ??? which is the right, I think must be included to all my thoughts, but the 'I think' is with all my thoughts. And, if it is with all, if no reality can be experienced without being my reality and my conscience and my thought. Without [sheet 25] I think, I have to think, that the pure self cannot be confused with any reality determined in particular. It should not disappear and fade away with each history or each moment of the history. It needs an identity and a permanent.... in the §57, p.190 (Ricoeur), Husserl deals with what I think, of a transcendence within the immanence.

Can't put it hors circuit.

.....

Second form, it is god himself.

What is the transcendence of God? Here, as he is about to reduce it, and not to postpone the problem, Husserl takes that divine absolute seriously. This time, he will no more deal with the name of God as an appendix and as a limited hypothesis, the revealed fiction of an eidos. God is no more a ghost.

So, what is the difference between God and the 'I'?

[sheet 26]

It differs first like the mediate which is different from the immediate. Before explaining the difference between both concepts, Husserl heralds it at the beginning of §58.

'the natural world on which is abandoned...quote...we designate the transcendence of God'. Immediate is the transcendence of the 'I', it is here that it is given to me each time and it is present for each moment of the history. There is no history which necessarily implies it and suggests its certainty. The 'I' is not given through an indication. It is not indirectly given to the history. Despite being distinct from the history, it is not separated from it and is melted to it in a way.

Whereas the transcendence in the immanence and the absolute that I call God is shown indirectly to the conscience in 3 different ways, as M. Ricoeur quotes it in the summary he gives of that § at the bottom of the page. And I would say that if God, if the absolute of the divine transcendence falls within the Ausschaltung, it is rightly because:

1/ that absolute is mediately announced to the conscience. But 2/ because that absolute, transcendent in the world, is announced to the conscience and in the conscience and better, it does it mediately only, because it is announced within and to the pure reduced conscience and that the reduction to which H submits it will only be put on hold and that God will reappear within the transcendent sphere. In other words, if you want, : in the case of the transcendence within the immanence and of the pure called I pure. H said : there is no

reduction but it is put on hold of a problematic which is not excluded from, in principle, from the transcendental sphere but [mis en suspense, crossed out, differed written above]. In the case of the transcendence in the immanence and of the absolute called God, Husserl will tell us, we will see I, that is not put on hold, not only a different problematic but a reduction of God, an exclusion outside the transcendent sphere. And it is mainly, as we will see it, because God only appears mediately as an absolute transcendence in the immanence of the conscience.

And I can say that we already perceive the reason why Husserl will naturally be led to suppress that reduction and to build up later a traditional problematic for God. Because if in a way appears only mediately from the immanence of the experience, it is also clear that it appears and that we cannot merely and simply exclude it. Because [] or rather naturally, the case of God is similar to the one of the alter ego. Though [sheet 27] the alter ego,...

If you want the case of God as it appears In the extract we are going to study is chosen and considered only within that solipsist phase that H considers to be the first and the most extreme step of the phenomenologist method, but which has to be overcome later. Then with the same movement through which H later will overcome the necessary solipsist phase of his thought, he would make the problem of God reappear...

Then the general meaning of that movement being cleared, let's scrutinize the text in which H alludes to the 3 ways according to which the divine transcendence mediately appears from the immanence of the cogito.

The first way is the one of the teleology, that is to say the recognition of a certain final order. What you have to understand here is that and it is difficult as it does not concern the ruling order in the existing nature, as through hypotheses, this one is reduced and excluded. But you know that the reduction from the outside world is not doubtful or a negation concerning that existence. The world is present, the world is always present within the conscience as a noema, that is to say in as its thought independently from its existence. In conjunction with with the noema, there are noematic acts within the targeted acts. But we cannot notice in the contents of that noetical-noematic structure a certain order, a certain regularity, a certain harmony which would enable us to recognize ourselves, to plan and to keep the sequencing, which would enable a certain history of the ego, as H will say it in the MC...

God who will appear through that teleology and that ordinance of all facts will be reduced. In all cases, we can see how throughout the order of fact where each normal history of the ego appears and where an absolute telos mediately is shown which is not in the world and which...

What is the second way, the second indication through which the divine absolute appears? It concerns here a theology which... the empirical world of the nature and of the spirit and notably in the field of life and of the living organisms leading to the humanity and to the

culture of the human history. But, this telos cannot be shown by a science of fact, an empirical science because it is a telos, because it is a mix of norms, of values, but yet

[goes straight to sheet 29- but clearly did not finish class- and so started again sheet 28 which then rejoined up with sheet 29]

[sheet 28]

Summary, either about showing universality of eidetic, or reduced, and it is what we studied last week – the proof of God, the proof of God in the second case is no more a conscience of fact among others, subjected to as all consciences to universal eidetic laws but, in that case, as a transcendent absolute in that immanence, transcendent absolute in the immanence, is also the situation of the pure I within the history. But the pure I cannot be subjected to the transcendent reduction because it would directly go to the history and to the immediate appearance. Its problem cannot be excluded from the problematic at that level, because it only mediately appears, in a non- original manner in the sphere of immanence. A distema appears according to the 3 indications or the 3 [] that we have studied ([ ]). The topic of God is therefore reduced and not only postponed, put on hold. But I have tried to show you or to assume that, despite the own explanation of H, rather put on hold than reduced, or rather than the reduction is always done for H by steps and, is considered final or provisional, according to the level taken into account.

[now back to flow sheet 29 ] But these values, that ethos appearing in life and in the culture and in the human history still appear through facts. So, it means dealing with the empirical sciences of nature, of life and of the spirit. It is undoubtedly an original limitation , as Husserl explains it, as it is a limitation which includes values and norms , but it is not [us] which is a limitation and that's why that second way is also reduced.

I read this passage : p 191 B.

The third way is the one of the religious conscience which H quickly deals with and carelessly (H says : 'we neglect'). H mentions the religious conscience as an indication through which God mediately appears in the conscience, because a religious conscience is a possibility for the conscience itself, an alteration of the conscience, which means that a dialogue with God and a link essentially to a transcendent conscience. It concerns the link with a transcendent absolute, a link of the characteristic as an intended alteration of the conscience. But it is still a fact, therefore of a certain provision because it is not the specificity for all consciences to be religious from a universal and essential point of view. It is in that respect that it can be reduced.

Read c. p.192.

You can therefore see how the problem of God appears, in these 3 ways. God is neither a ghost, nor a limited concept. He appears as a unique absolute, as an original transcendence

within the immanence and, if it can nonetheless be reduced, it is because that absolute, on the one hand, appears mediately to the conscience and, on the other hand, that mediate always has a share of original limitation which, as all limitation has to be excluded from the sphere ?? tal.

It is the conclusion drawn by Husserl.

Read p. 192 D.

Therefore the situation of that divine absolute is not easily reduced and is not pure as I said it before, the divine absolute, the transcendence within the immanence is likely to be, like for the pure, put on hold rather than reduced.

Nonetheless, there is something final in that reduction and the final result is the following one: in spite of the fact that Husserl gives no opinion, as he repeatedly underlines it in all theologic theses, although God is only reduced and not refused or denied in that existence, it already appears that to a certain conception of God, a certain way to imagine God has become nearly impossible. And even if the name of god will reappear in the phenomenologic speech, it will not be the same God who has been reduced anymore. He is a God who, through the methodological process of the reduction, has lost all his classical ontological characteristics. [sheet 30]. What will reappear within the transcendental sphere is a God who does not come from a classical God, and whose image will not be the one of a classical God anymore. It means that, to go back to the problem of the 'Methode' and of the 'Metaphysique' that we have never given up in the non-theological process (because the will for H has a methodological meaning and that the methodology is always present as the Method, as the method of the method, the super method) so, in the methodological process, some metaphysical or ontological theses would be present or revealed. It means that the methodology is never pure and that it is, in one form or another, linked to speculative or ontological assumptions, or it is itself, speculative without knowing it, that is to say a speculative thought on an already given ontology. That alteration of the concept of God is very clear, appears clearly when we see it reappear in the new phase of the phenomenology that we are now dealing with. That phase seemed to have started in the 20s. What is remarkable is that nearly no thought of Husserl concerning the problem of God was neither published when he was still alive, nor shown in the improved works that H accepted to publish. You know that H always hesitated a lot before accepting to publish (help)... it is the sign of uneasiness, of a worry and of a dissatisfaction, and also a sign to fix and formulate his thoughts on this issue.

My first point therefore concerns that alteration of the concept of God following and by the methodological reduction 1) it is a criterion if God is an absolute immediately appearing in the sphere tal. It cannot be an absolute transcendent God determining from the outside the world and the conscience.

2) if God cannot, even if he exists [sheet 32], alter the eidetic laws, he cannot be a God creating beings and eternal truths, existences and essences.

Consequently, you just have to go through the methodological phase of the phenomenological reduction to do more than reducing, to suppress the classical concept of God who is fashionable and anthropologist.

In an unpublished work of 1926-7 (F.1.33) Husserl expresses a certain primitivism which consists in confusing the pure nature with the culture, that is to say with the [] meanings of the spirit which include that nature. That attitude consists in an animated species which does not isolate the pure nature from the meanings by our culture, plan, finalise the world in an intemporal way, he... and H précises that this attitude is not only the one of the primitive groups but also of millions of Europeans or men living within the western culture.

Here is an extract of that unpublished work: 'finally, it also concerns within the monotheist European culture, millions of men who see God in a really anthropologist manner and as an anthropologist creator of the world: the world itself is represented like a fantastic cultural representation'.

And that primitive naivety prevailing in the western  $\phi$  is not only condemned as an anthropologist artificialism but as polytheism as well.

In a secondary text of the Krisis p.335, Husserl writes : 'God in plural, the mythical powers in all kinds, are some objects of the surrounding world (cultural) which have the same situation of reality as the anima or the man. As regards the notion of God, the singular is essential'. This is to include to the concept of Husserl concerning God, the primitive concept of H, of God as a value and as a transcendental being'. As regards the notion of God, the singular is essential. On the side of the man, it belongs to God that its meaning to be and its meaning of value must be felt like an absolute inner demand'.

[sheet 33]

What does this sentence mean: 'on the side of the man, it belongs to God that its meaning to be and its meaning of value must be felt like an inner absolute experience'. It means that at least god must be met in the world or elsewhere like a thing...

[monotheism]

When we speak about God, we always think about an absolute unity and which is definitely transcendent to another absolute of the conscience, whereas here it would rather be a dimension or a divine depth of the conscience or of the transcendency itself. It is undoubtedly the reason why H often speaks more of Gottheit than Gott, of divinity or of deity rather than God.

Then, of course, we would say it is a blasphemy or an atheism and, concerning Husserl and Heidegger in front of that divine reduction, we can therefore think that there is no more subtle and more destructive atheism than the one which confuses god with a certain demonstration of the sacred. Husserl would answer to that that the  $\varphi$  must start to be, according to the expression met in one of the unpublished works entitled 'undenominational way towards God' and we have to start to understand what the divinity of the deity is, that is to say the main phenomenon of god before speaking of God. To speak of god, you have first to know what the divinity of god is, what is the being and the meaning of god.

So, the meaning of the name and the language of God, concerning God, must be taken from the reduced transcendent conference, in the immanence of the unity of the thought. That's why the first definition of god, the one we can find in Ideen I, the position of god as an absolute transcendence in the immanence, that forward-looking definition is absolutely final and firm. It is therefore through the better knowledge of that meaning of that transcendence in the immanence that we let God discover himself as something different from the conscience but, in a certain way, for the conscience to be itself while escaping by itself. It is therefore not surprising to see that the development or the reappearance of the topic of the divinity is linked to the development of the three following topics:

1. The topic of what H calls the ideal objectivity, topic which is very early present in the analyses of H but which particularly opens from the LFT and which suggests a more and more historical background.

What is it in fact ?

[sheet 34].

A real object that table is an object because it is partly in front of me, because it is neither suggested nor refused. It is refused because it does not rely on me to exist and because its existence resists me. I cannot do what I want, first concerning my eyes and my gestures, as well as my intuitions. It does not only concern what I think. Its objectivity can...

The same thing applies for example for a mathematical truth. A mathematical or an essence truth, as we have seen it, for all conscience as a rule and even for God... their objectivity is absolute because they are resolutely ideal, that is to say does not [include] any reference to a sensible perfection de facto. Then, what in the history, that these truths as we have seen it, are not due to chance, encourage us to build ideal objects, truths, real truths which are endless, for all kinds of subjects, it is first an infinite intention which becomes finite. It is the one of such or such conscience... indeed, the conscience projects such objects which, therefore, research the truth, demand the truth, the conscience being responsible of the history, of that infinite and of that universality, the conscience which is called for such a project which spreads the whole of what is escaped. That conscience which thinks beyond its dummy determinations, the universal

truth, that conscience which lays and think about the value of the universal and infinite truth, that conscience makes the divine in itself appear because, for H, the question is not to delegate metaphysically the responsibility of a thought or the creation of eternal truths towards a God different from the human and historical subjectivity. There is not first an infinite thought to act which would appear or fall in our history. God is himself an history. The infinite and the universality are noemic characteristics, that is to say that only an historical conscience can think. Because for H, as he asserts it in a letter (published in the  $\phi$ ical studies of 1954, p.36), the subjectivity is historical on either side. So, the infinite and the universality are the characteristics of noeme, in other words a meaning thought by a conscience. And what is thought in the noeme, as a noeme, is the eidos, that is to say an essence. But neither the noeme nor the essence for H exists in itself ( $\neq$ Platonic).

They are the unimals [sheet 35], as H often says, which are only for a whole conscience. There is not therefore any infinite nor universality or an independent eternity of a fully historical and temporal conscience (multi-temporality). The telos of the truth, as it can be shown in the science and the  $\phi$  of the Europe principle, is thus the manifestation of the divinity, appearance of the divine in the history, appearance of the divine logos, that is to say both the infinite intellect and of the language because H shows it quite well in his last writings, the language is an intrinsic condition of the building up of these truths and these ideal objects which cannot be through the truth they bear themselves. We can therefore see that the divinity is linked to the history itself because there would not be any history if some truths, that is to say some ideal objects and their language could be transmitted [] and [].

The second solidary topic linked to the divinity, is the one that H calls the idea according to the Kantian meaning. You know that for Kant the idea, is a concept of the pure reasoning, which settles the understanding and hence the experience, according to the Kant terminology, but while settling as its main principle the experience, the first always insofar as this one is always inadequate. God is one of the three important concepts of the pure reasoning according to Kant (God, the soul, the self,  $<->$ ).

Well, that essential inadequation and that overflow, it is what Kant repeatedly means and whenever he [] that notion of idea with the Kantian terminology, that is to say that idea of the infinite, he does not think as a genuine and present infinite, but as an infinite an inexhaustible indefinite for the essence, an opening, an horizon, a tear of the finite.

That tear on which all finiteness can be perceived, it appears at least for 3 opportunities under the name of idea according to the Kantian terminology with Husserl.

- a) It appears concerning the data of the thing as a rule, all things, all X given as being the object of a continuous and infinite determination. We have never been able to determine a thing. In other words, the relevant characteristic of

a thing is an infinite task. But, it is the Idea of the thing as determinable for the thing, that is to say the practical idea, moral idea, telos, a theoretical task. God both appears as the telos of the truth and as the value and the perception of a task. In § 41 of the RI, H writes 'for the philosophy and the phenomenology which studies the link between the being and the conscience, the 'being' is a practical idea, the idea that an infinite work of theoretical determination' and in an extract called 'the  $\phi$  as a conscience awareness of the humankind', Husserl *précise* his thought:

[sheet 36].

'to be reasonable... sensible means to be sensible... it is not harmful for the reasoning to be distinguished in 'theory', and in 'practice' or aesthetic'. Being a man means being in the same teleological way, it means you have to be'.

Following the phenomenological proof of that idea according to the Kantian ideology, as the pole of the infinite resolution of the thing and, it is on the condition of that proof that I invite you to consult §142 of the *Ideen I*.

The second form of that idea, according to the Kantian terminology, appears from the seizure of the flow of the history. The flow of history is always unfinished, as a temporality infinite in the present and in the future (claim and retention of claim). And I know a priori that unachievement includes a unit. It is always granted and there is [] always from the flow of the history in the horizon of the temporality... the totality of that linking is never done and is not likely to be given through a sole pure look. And yet in a way or another, but in a different way by principle, all the things which can be seized intuitively, namely in the form of the absence of limits in the development that the immanent perceptions show, when we go through an already stable history to new histories which build up its horizon... the settlement of the latter to the horizon to the settlement of their horizon and so on... law... it is within that continuous development of seizure to seizure that we seize in a way, I can say it, the flow of the history itself as a unit. We cannot seize it as a sole history but as an idea according to the Kantian terminology. This not something you state and you assert at random it is an undoubtedly indubitable data, taking the word 'data' in a wider meaning consequently. That indubitability is also grounded on the intuition or another source as the one concerned when it concerns the being of the history; these ones, we know it, access to the category of the data during the immanent perception. It is precisely the own characteristic of the thinking, which is the perception of an 'idea' according to the Kantian terminology and which does not lose the transparency of the obvious... that the adequate determination of its own contents, that is to say here of the flow of the history, cannot be reached.'

There is therefore an original evidence of the horizon of the history in so much as it spreads infinitely each history and is not confused with it [sheet 38]. It is therefore the



evidence of an infinite horizon but of the horizon of my experience... horizon according to which my experience is always inadequate but giving it its temporal unit.

The third function of that idea according to the Kantian terminology appears as what Husserl calls the idealization, that is to say the building up of the ideal object. For example, to produce the rightness of a mathematical notion, you have to free from the inaccuracy of the forms of perception where there is never any pure law, no pure line, no perfect circle, etc. You have to, through pure thought, reach the infinite limit to an infinite progress to improve the empirical forms. The geometric line supposes reaching the limit of a purification of what, for a perception, has an approached propriety... reaching the infinite limit is only possible if the idea is present in the conscience according to the Kantian terminology. That idea of the infinite therefore enables to build up the mathematics, hence the pure scientific part of the unbiased science. There is no unbiased without that idea of the infinite. And there would be no pure history without that truth of the science, without that universal objectivity. Because, without it, the meaning could not be transmitted infinitely and there would be no empirical aggregate of [] of [] etc... So, the condition of the pure history is that interruption of the infinite idea which somewhat opened the history itself at the beginning of Europe in the Greek-European home to the mathematical idealization and the  $\varphi$  were instantaneous...

The infinite idea is therefore the opening of the history, the logos at the beginning and which gives a telos to the history. It is about the topic of the infiniteness, to this second topic that the name of god is more and more assured in the texts of the last period. God is not a transcendent being going in the history, he is the opening and the stone of the history as per the infinite telos, that is to say much postponed and located infinitely as an horizon.

The third topic to which the name of God is linked in the unpublished works of the last period is the one of the inter-subjectivity and of the community of the monads. That is why it appears not too late, but following the solipsistic and egologic phase of the phenomenology which, according to H, must be the first independent phase of the phenomenology.

The explicit problematic of the alter ego and the one for god can just be accessory and grounded on that first problematic because God and the later ego are only given in a very quick and specific evidence, indirect (we saw it concerning God, you can see it in the ...Ideen 2§46§140§151.

[sheet 41] [intercalated cards between].

Quick and not original, the obvious of the alter ego and of God which has to be indispensable as well because first, as H shows it, in the CM, the inter-subjectivity is the pre-requisite of the objectivity. Being unbiased means being true for everyone, for an us, for the other and for me. And the unit of the world in which we are living is possible for a community of egos. Consequently if the topic of the

inter-subjectivity is accessory in the methodological order of the description and of the phenomenological explanation, it is already implied in the idea of the truth itself, in the meaning of the unity of the world, etc.

So, now, are the alter ego and God are united and narrowed in the thematizations because their types of existence are similar (non -original, quick, etc.). No, they are to be narrowed for more intrinsic and deeper reasons. God is the telos, the pole of the community of the physical monads []. He is the value which gathers and unites [in all] the egologic subjectivities in the same project, the same kind of discovery task, to tell the truth in an infinite story. We can also add that God is not an absolute monad, the monadic Leibnizian God working in the city of God and of... God is the pole, the telos that the moralities and the community lays itself as an end and as a value. If the divine telos is transcendent, it is like an aim we suggest, it is the pole for oneself of the transcendental inter-subjectivity. That is why not only is there no reality in itself of the divine telos, but that telos is never fully reached. It is always beyond, spreading transcendentally or reduced from the history. It is itself the movement of the infinite, indefinite, endless history.

Now that that notion of divinity is briefly located in the speech of Husserl, we can read together a few extracts where God and like H.

In E III9 p.66, H writes: 'the absolute universal reduction is the will of God in a full and whole meaning'. That will is therefore our total will, the practical will in a position of absolute value, position of a 'vorhaben', of an endless task and not the will of a real transcendent god. Because that will is not [] universal.

Husserl also says: 'God is the absolute logos, the absolute truth in a full and global meaning, as for 'unum, bonum, verum' (transcendent terms) towards which is oriented all finite beings [sheet 42] in the unity of an aspiration including all the finite beings and each of them in particular'. It is the God of Aristotle, except that it does not exist in itself (critics of the Aristotlian God in the contemporary manuscripts of the Krisis, ceti [p.276).

The fact that God does not exist in itself and is the teleological idea of the history, here is a text which testifies that fact, according to Husserl ;

'God is not the whole for the nomads (...of fact), but the entelechy (telos) (altered classical language) which can be found in the latter, as an idea of the infinite telos of the [], of the humanity telos ruled by the absolute reasoning'.

Finally, for H, god is not an infinite finished, through decisions, positive with a classical meaning but must always be unfinished, as the history is always going on, that there is a 'Selbstrealisierungprozess der gottheit': a process of another achievement of the *seite*. I would refer to that text of the C group (of 1934), where Husserl having underlined that the whole monads is only possible when temporalizing itself, concludes: 'no being exists, not even the being absolutely existing (conscience of God) cannot exist without an horizon and then the omni-monadic being is a being in an horizon and it includes the infiniteness, an infinite potentiality.'

Before concluding on the moving coherence of that phenomenology, I would like to indicate you--without commenting upon it--a suggestion of Abbe Toulemont, both in the book concerning the essence of the society according to Husserl p.303. It is a suggestion according to which H, all men

would have taken a certain distance [for their life], a deceptive disillusioned distance as regards that non confessional treatment of God by the phenomenology, and he would have told to Edith Stein, who had been his collaborator and his follower (and so you know the []) : 'the life of men is nothing else than a way towards God- I have tried to reach the target without the help of the theology, its proofs, its methods. In other words, I wanted to reach god without God. I needed to eliminate God from my scientific thought to open the way to those who don't know, like us, the safe way of the faith coming from the church' (and so an unpublished extract of 1936 H says that the Krisis, has a 'specifically theological meaning' despite first not expressed.

[sheet 43] conclusion.

2 points.

1/ I would first focus on the links of complex involvement between the phenomenological and the metaphysical methods for the ontology and the theology, such as they were revealed concerning God , as they did in the classical  $\varphi$  (D.S.K.H.) Claiming to deal with God in a purely methodological way in te ..Phen, H had already ontological presumptions which have remained the same later on.

2/ I would suggest you to have a look at the conclusion of the lecture of M.M [Metaphysical Method] and notably on the infinite and indefinite intentionality of the debate which was the last form of the dialogue between M .M. I hope to have shown you some of the answers H brought to that debate, and it as my sole ambition to encourage you to read Husserl.

Next time: yes for the finiteness.

M.ho.